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Sexual Orientation Categories1 
 
How ought we to categorize individuals with respect to sexual orientation? It might be the case, as 
Esa Díaz-León argues, that we ought to use ordinary categories such as homosexual, heterosexual, 
and bisexual.2 Or perhaps, as Robin Dembroff argues, we ought to employ alternative categories 
such as female-oriented, male-oriented, woman-oriented, and genderqueer-oriented.3 
 
In this paper, I argue that the normatively important aims of LGBTQIA+ social movements 
provide reason to endorse a categorization scheme that (i) includes the categories heterosexual, 
homosexual, bisexual, asexual, and queer, (ii) distinguishes between attractions to sex features and 
attractions to gender features, and (iii) allows an element of interpretation, such that individuals 
have authority over which of their attractions (related to sex and/or gender features) matter to their 
orientation.  
 
Here’s the plan. In the first section, I’ll outline the desiderata for a theory of how we ought to 
categorize individuals with respect to sexual orientation. In the second and third sections, I’ll argue 
against the respective theories of Díaz-León and Dembroff. Then, in the fourth section, I’ll 
explicate and defend the aforementioned categorization scheme.  
 
1. Sexual Orientation Categorization Schemes 
 
There are a variety of ways in which a society might categorize individuals with respect to 
sexuality: queer or straight, polyamorous or monogamous, submissive or dominant. Not all 
divisions with respect to sexuality, however, are divisions with respect to sexual orientation. For 
example, there aren’t any (present, actual) sexual orientations which involve being attracted to 
persons with red hair, musical talent, or sleekly furnished apartments. Notwithstanding the fact 
that individuals are sexually attracted to persons with the aforementioned features, individuals 
aren’t “red hair oriented,” “musical talent oriented,” or “sleek apartment oriented.” But there are 
sexual orientations which involve being attracted to persons with particular sex and/or gender 
                                               
1 Special thanks to Elizabeth Barnes, Ross Cameron, Robin Dembroff, Esa Díaz-León, Barrett 
Emerick, Aaron Griffith, Sally Haslanger, Zac Irving, Katharine Jenkins, Rebecca Mason, Asya 
Passinsky, Dee Payton, Zoe Pettler, Kevin Richardson, Jenny Saul, Peter Tan, and Alana Wilde 
2 Esa Díaz-León, “Sexual Orientations: The Desire View,” forthcoming in Feminist Philosophy of 
Mind (Oxford, Oxford University Press).  
3 Robin A. Dembroff, “What is Sexual Orientation?,” Philosophers’ Imprint 16 (2016), 22-3. 
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features.4 Following Dembroff, let’s say that—as a contingent matter in contemporary Western 
societies—being attracted to persons with particular sex and/or gender features involves a sexual 
orientation, while being attracted to persons with red hair involves a sexual druther, in which 
druthers are “specific preferences of sexual partners within potential partners according to one’s 
sexual orientation.”5  
 
Relatedly, let’s say that an orientation categorization scheme marks the primary divisions that a 
society makes with respect to sexuality. For example, a possible society that primarily divides 
individuals on the basis of whether or not they’re attracted to Madonna has an orientation 
categorization scheme that exhaustively includes the categories Madonna-oriented and not-
Madonna-oriented. Closer to home, many societies have primarily categorized individuals on the 
basis of “active” or “passive” sexual role, with interesting cross-cultural variations regarding the 
interpretations of these notions.6 Here it’s evident that the divisions we make with respect to 
sexuality are deeply contingent. And so, our social practices of sexual categorization are open to 
normative assessment and political revision.  
 
In contemporary Western societies, the socially dominant orientation categorization scheme 
primarily divides individuals on the basis of whether they’re attracted to individuals with the same 
or “opposite” sex and gender features as themselves, and it exhaustively includes the categories 
homosexual and heterosexual. Notice that the socially dominant orientation categorization scheme 
doesn’t have a place for individuals who are attracted to both women and men. That is, it 
contributes to bisexual erasure, such that bisexual experience is systematically ignored, denied, or 
misrepresented. With this example in mind, it’s evident that the following question is normatively 
significant: How ought we to categorize individuals with respect to sexual orientation? 
 
                                               
4 Here, I’ll use the term ‘sex’ to refer to certain chromosomal, hormonal, and/or anatomical features 
(without ruling on constructed or non-constructed status of these features). And I’ll use the term 
‘gender’ to refer to social situatedness and/or self-identity. With the following exceptions, I’ll 
otherwise remain neutral about sex, gender, and the difference (if any) between them. First, sex 
isn’t binary; that is, there are sex categories other than female and male, such as intersex. Second, 
gender isn’t binary; that is, there are gender categories other than woman and man, such as 
genderqueer. Third, sex doesn’t determine gender, such that, e.g., some men have female-coded 
chromosomal, hormonal, and/or anatomical features. 
5 Ibid., 7. 
6 For example, in 15th century Florence, performing oral sex on another male was considered part 
of the active role, see David M. Halperin, “How to Do the History of Male Homosexuality,” Gay 
and Lesbian Quarterly 6 (2000), 94-9, 102-9. 
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More precisely, what concepts of sexual orientation categories ought we to use? Following Ásta, 
let’s say that a category is a collection of individuals that instantiate a common property.7 For 
example, the category water is a collection of individuals that instantiate the property of (let’s say) 
being H2O. And, following Haslanger, let’s say that concepts are “dispositions to be responsive to 
differences in a particular region of possible worlds.”8 On this usage, an individual possesses a 
concept of water just in case they’re disposed differently to interact with members and non-
members of the category water. For example, individuals who possess a concept of water will 
generally give thirsty terriers H2O (as opposed to tuna) and experience surprise upon seeing tuna 
(as opposed to H2O) fall from the sky.  
 
Now, there are a variety of categories associated with sexuality. For example, as noted above, 
there’s a category of individuals who are attracted to Madonna. Yet, there wouldn’t be much of an 
improvement with respect to coordinated activity if we came to possess a concept such that we 
were disposed to differentiate between individuals who are attracted to Madonna and individuals 
who are not. In contrast, it might be useful to have a concept of the category of individuals who 
are attracted to women, or a concept of the category of women who are attracted to women.  
 
With the relation between concepts and coordinated activity in mind, here I endorse an 
ameliorative approach to concept choice.9 In particular, I hold that concepts of sexual orientation 
categories ought to satisfy the following ameliorative desiderata: 
 
(i) Allow the ascription of sexual orientations to non-cisheterosexual individuals, and 
 
(ii) Be conducive to the constitutive aims of LGBTQIA+ social movements.10  
 
Regarding ameliorative desideratum (i), an individual is cisheterosexual just in case they’re 
cisgender and more-or-less exclusively attracted to individuals of the “opposite” sex and gender. 
                                               
7 Ásta, Categories We Live By: The Construction of Sex, Gender, Race, and Other Social 
Categories (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 1-2. 
8 Haslanger, “How Not to Change the Subject” (forthcoming). In particular: “[t]o possess a concept 
(and/or to grasp a meaning) is to have some cluster of capacities and mechanisms for using that 
grid of possibilities at some level of resolution, i.e., for making distinction(s), processing and 
storing the relevant information, answering questions,” ibid. 
9 For discussion of ameliorative projects, see esp. Sally Haslanger, “What Are We Talking About: 
The Semantics and Politics of Social Kinds” in Resisting Reality: Social Construction and Social 
Critique (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 376-9. 
10 Dembroff and Díaz-León endorse similar ameliorative desiderata, see Dembroff, “What is 
Sexual Orientation?,” 5 and Díaz-León, “Sexual Orientations: The Desire View” (forthcoming).  
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With Dembroff, let’s say that cisgender individuals are individuals whose “genders are the ones 
assigned to them at birth on the basis of their anatomy.”11 With this background at hand, 
desideratum (i) amounts to the following: an orientation categorization scheme ought to allow the 
ascription of sexual orientations to non-heterosexual persons, transgender persons, intersex 
persons, as well as persons who are attracted to transgender or intersex persons.12 
 
Next, ameliorative desideratum (ii) holds that an orientation categorization scheme ought to be 
conducive to the constitutive aims of LGBTQIA+ social movements. Here the idea is that just as 
universities ought to have certain aims related to research and education in virtue of being 
universities, so LGBTQIA+ social movements ought to have certain aims (specified below), which 
I refer to as ‘constitutive aims’. I appeal to constitutive aims—not merely actual aims—on account 
of the fact that contemporary LGBTQIA+ social movements don’t always live up to the demands 
of gender and sexuality justice. For example, transgender individuals are still marginalized in 
contemporary LGBTQIA+ social movements. This is a historical irony, as contemporary 
LGBTQIA+ social movements have roots in transgender resistance to police brutality.13 Of course, 
the marginalization of transgender persons in contemporary LGBTQIA+ social movements is 
morally wrong. But it’s also hypocritical. It violates the following constitutive aim of LGBTQIA+ 
social movements: promote the well-being of non-cisheterosexual individuals.  
 
Perhaps controversially, I hold that the following is also a constitutive aim of LGBTQIA+ social 
movements: promote queer culture. For example, consider the queer kinship practice referred to 
as ‘chosen family’. In lieu of an extended anthropological description, here’s Hector 
Xtravaganza’s famous description of the governing principle of the queer kinship practice: “Blood 
does not a family make. Those are relatives. Family are those with whom you share your good, 
bad, and ugly, and still love one another in the end. Those are the ones you select.”14 Because so 
many LGBTQIA+ individuals are displaced from traditional family structures,15 queer kinship 
                                               
11 Dembroff, “What is Sexual Orientation?,” 2. For a similar definition, see Talia Mae Bettcher, 
“Intersexuality, Transgender, and Transsexuality,” in The Oxford Handbook of Feminist Theory 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press: 2016), 408. 
12 Here, I remain neutral about the metaphysics of transgender gender identity and intersex identity. 
13 See Susan Stryker and Victor Silverman, Screaming Queens: The Riot at Compton’s Cafeteria 
(San Francisco: 2005). 
14 Derek M. Norman, “A Glittering Goodbye to Hector Xtravaganza,” nytimes.com, accessed June 
2020. 
15 For example, of all youth experiencing homelessness, “20% identify as gay or lesbian, 7% 
identify as bisexual, and 2% identify as questioning their sexuality […] 2% identify as transgender 
female, 1% identify as transgender male, and 1% identify as gender queer [… The] most prevalent 
reason for homelessness among LGBTQ youth was being forced out of home or running away 
from home because of their sexual orientation or gender identity/expression,” Choi, S.K., Wilson, 
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practices are especially important to the well-being of LGBTQIA+ individuals. The aim of 
promoting queer culture, however, isn’t merely subsidiary to the aforementioned aim of improving 
LGBTQIA+ well-being. That’s because straight culture is also harmful to many cisheterosexual 
individuals, and an especially promising ameliorative strategy is gradually to bring straight cultural 
practices in line with the relevant queer cultural phenomena.16 Make the world more just by making 
it queer! 
 
Now, in the service of their constitutive aims, LGBTQIA+ social movements inherit a variety of 
subsidiary aims. For example, in order to advance the well-being of non-cisheterosexual 
individuals, LGBTQIA+ social movements take on the subsidiary aim of securing legal protections 
against sexuality-based and gender-based discrimination. Likewise, LGBTQIA+ social 
movements take on the subsidiary aim of ensuring that non-cisheterosexual individuals aren’t 
excluded from orientation categorizations.17 Additionally, in order to promote queer culture, 
LGBTQIA+ social movements take on the subsidiary aim of creating and maintaining spaces—
including neighborhoods, bars, bookstores, and community centers—that are especially conducive 
to engaging in queer cultural practices.18 With an account of the aims of LGBTQIA+ social 
movements at hand, I turn to consider how various categorization schemes fare with respect to the 
ameliorative desiderata. This is, in part, a contextual matter. And so, it’s important to be clear that 
I’ll focus on contemporary Western contexts.   
 
2. The Socially Dominant Orientation Categorization Scheme  
  
The socially dominant orientation categorization scheme exhaustively includes the categories 
homosexual and heterosexual. As noted above, the socially dominant orientation categorization 
scheme contributes to bisexual erasure. And so, it ought to be rejected. In what follows, I’ll 
consider a revised version of the socially dominant orientation categorization scheme endorsed by 
Díaz-León, which is explicitly amended to include categories such as bisexual and asexual.  
 
                                               
B.D.M., Shelton, J., and Gates, G., “Serving Our Youth 2015: The Needs and Experiences of 
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Questioning Youth Experiencing Homelessness,” The 
Williams Institute with True Colors Fund (2015), 4-5. 
16 See Dembroff, “Real Talk on the Metaphysics of Gender,” Philosophical Topics (forthcoming). 
For a general discussion of politically motivated cultural change, see Haslanger, “Culture and 
Critique,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume XCI (2017), 153-9, 168-
9. 
17 In this way, desideratum (i) is included in desideratum (ii). I’ve separated the ameliorative 
desiderata for dialectical purposes. 
18 See Matthew Andler, “The Sexual Orientation/Identity Distinction,” Hypatia (forthcoming).  
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As discussed in the previous section, LGBTQIA+ social movements take on the aim of securing 
legal protections against orientation-based discrimination. The revised version of the socially 
dominant orientation categorization scheme is conducive to this aim because it can be used to track 
orientation-based discrimination. For example, consider a case in which an adoption agency denies 
the application of a homosexual, bisexual, or asexual individual who wants to adopt a child. If the 
individual’s heterosexual counterpart would have been selected to adopt a child, there’s evidence 
that the homosexual, bisexual, or asexual individual experienced orientation-based 
discrimination.19 Along these lines, categories such as homosexual, bisexual, and asexual can be 
used in legal contexts to protect individuals against orientation-based discrimination. 
 
This notwithstanding, the revised version of the socially dominant orientation categorization 
scheme fails to satisfy ameliorative desideratum (i). On this point, Dembroff claims:  
 
Confusions between sex and gender—especially with regard to sexual orientation—
regularly create difficulties for queer, gender-nonconforming, and intersex persons, as well 
as their partners. How should gender-nonconforming, transgender, or intersex persons (or 
their partners) describe their sexual orientations? […] The current categories of sexual 
orientation offer little to no flexibility or clarity for these individuals. For these reasons, 
the current categories reinforce cisnormativity as well as heteronormativity. That is, 
because the current categories […] have no place at all for many transgender or intersex 
individuals (or persons attracted to these individuals), they perpetuate prejudices that 
sexual orientations and gender identities that do not meet standard binaries of 
homosexual/heterosexual and cisgender man/cisgender woman are somehow deviant, 
dysfunctional, or even nonexistent.20 
 
Here, Dembroff provides a powerful argument that thickly-relational orientation categorization 
schemes don’t allow the ascription of orientations to many non-cisheterosexual individuals. 
Thickly-relational orientation categorization schemes primarily include thickly-relational 
categories such as heterosexual and bisexual, in which an individual is a member of a thickly-
relational orientation category in virtue of their own sex and/or gender in relation to the sex and/or 
gender of the individuals to which they’re attracted.21 For example, roughly, an individual is a 
                                               
19 Note that in many jurisdictions in the United States, LGBTQIA+ individuals still aren’t protected 
against discrimination by adoption agencies. See Elizabeth A. Harris, “Same-Sex Parents Still Face 
Legal Complications,” nytimes.com, accessed June 2020. 
20 Dembroff, “What is Sexual Orientation?,” 5. 
21 See Matthew Andler, “Sexual Orientation, Ideology, and Philosophical Method,” Journal of 
Social Ontology (2020), 215. 
 7 
member of the thickly-relational category homosexual in virtue of being attracted to individuals 
with the same sex and/or gender as themselves. In contrast, thinly-relational categorization 
schemes primarily include thinly-relational categories such as male-oriented and genderqueer-
oriented, in which an individual is a member of a thinly-relational orientation category solely in 
virtue of the sex and/or gender of the individuals to which they’re attracted.22 For example, an 
individual is a member of the thinly-relational category male-oriented solely in virtue of being 
attracted to male individuals, irrespective of their own sex features. With this terminology at hand, 
I understand Dembroff’s argument against thickly-relational categorization schemes as follows:23  
 
(1) We only ought to endorse an orientation categorization scheme if it ascribes orientations 
to transgender, genderqueer, and intersex individuals, as well as to individuals who are 
attracted to transgender, genderqueer, or intersex individuals. 
 
(2) Thickly-relational orientation categorization schemes cannot ascribe orientations to many 
transgender, genderqueer, and intersex individuals, as well as to many individuals who are 
attracted to transgender, genderqueer, or intersex individuals. 
 
(3) Therefore, we ought to reject thickly-relational orientation categorization schemes. (1,2)  
 
And here’s Dembroff’s reason for endorsing the second premise.  
 
(i) Thickly-relational categorization schemes can only ascribe orientations to members of 
the following attenuated set of individuals: female women and male men who are 
exclusively attracted to female women and/or male man.24 
 
(ii) Many transgender, genderqueer, and intersex individuals are, e.g., female men, male 
women, genderqueer individuals, or intersex individuals; that is, many transgender, 
genderqueer, and intersex individuals are not members of the aforementioned 
attenuated set. 
 
                                               
22 Ibid.  
23 Dembroff, “What is Sexual Orientation?,” 5, 19, 24-5. 
24 Regarding the source of exclusion, Dembroff claims: “assumptions that sexual orientation is 
always one-dimensional—concerning either sex-attraction or gender-attraction, but never a 
combination of the two—and that sexual orientation concerns the sex or gender of both potential 
partners are deeply embedded within the concepts associated with [categories such as homosexual 
and heterosexual …] The current concepts of ‘homosexual’ and ‘heterosexual’ […] inherently 
refer to a relation between the sexes (or genders) of sexual partners,” ibid., 24-5. 
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(iii) Many individuals who are attracted to transgender, genderqueer, or intersex individuals 
are attracted to, e.g., female men, male women, genderqueer individuals, or intersex 
individuals; that is, many individuals who are attracted to transgender, genderqueer, or 
intersex individuals are not members of the aforementioned attenuated set. 
 
(iv) Thickly-relational orientation categorization schemes cannot ascribe orientations to 
some transgender, genderqueer, and intersex individuals. (i, ii) 
 
(v) Thickly-relational orientation categorization schemes cannot ascribe orientations to 
some individuals who are attracted to transgender, genderqueer, or intersex individuals. 
(i, iii) 
 
Dembroff explains that the revised version of the socially dominant categorization scheme only 
ascribes orientations to members of the attenuated set of individuals described in premise (i).25 For 
example, consider Josephine, a female woman who is exclusively attracted to female men. On the 
revised version of the socially dominant categorization scheme, Josephine isn’t heterosexual (as 
she’s not exclusively attracted to male men), homosexual (as she’s not exclusively attracted to 
female women) or bisexual (as she’s not attracted to female women and male men). In section 
four, I’ll return to Dembroff’s argument against thickly-relational categorization schemes. Here, I 
reject the revised version of the socially dominant categorization scheme because it fails to satisfy 
ameliorative desideratum (i). 
 
3. Dembroff’s Alternative Orientation Categorization Scheme 
 
As noted above, Dembroff endorses a thinly-relational orientation categorization scheme. On this 
point, Dembroff claims that they understand sexual orientation, “solely in terms of the sex[es] and 
gender[s] of the persons one is disposed to sexually engage, without reference to the sex or gender 
of the person so disposed.”26 Dembroff’s account of sexual orientation is generally neutral with 
respect to the metaphysics of sex and gender.27 Here, I’ll consider a version of Dembroff’s 
categorization scheme that includes the following categories (among others): intersex-oriented, 
female-oriented, woman-oriented, and genderqueer-oriented. 
 
To begin, note that Dembroff’s categorization scheme can ascribe orientations to non-
cisheterosexual individuals. For example, from the previous section, consider Josephine, a female 
                                               
25 Ibid., 5.  
26 Ibid., 19.  
27 Ibid., 9-12. 
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woman who is exclusively attracted to female men. On Dembroff’s account, Josephine is female-
oriented and man-oriented. For another example, consider Dylan, an intersex man who is 
exclusively attracted to female women. On Dembroff’s account, Dylan is female-oriented and 
woman-oriented. Here, I agree with Dembroff that their categorization scheme is “capable of 
recognizing persons outside the gender or sex binary.”28 Dembroff’s categorization scheme 
satisfies ameliorative desideratum (i). 
 
Moving to ameliorative desideratum (ii), Dembroff argues that their categorization scheme can be 
used in legal contexts to protect non-cisheterosexual individuals against discrimination. On this 
point, Dembroff claims: 
 
[Concepts of thinly-relational orientation categories provide] tools for lawmakers to secure 
protections for sexual orientation under pre-existing protections against gender- and sex-
discrimination [… Sexual] orientation discrimination can be easily re-described in terms 
of gender or sex discrimination by holding fixed that multiple individuals share the same 
sex- or gender attractions, and yet some are discriminated against simply because they have 
a particular sex or gender in addition to those attractions.”29  
 
For example, consider Chris, a female man who is exclusively attracted to female women. Suppose 
that an adoption agency denies Chris’ application, and further suppose that the male counterpart 
of Chris (who, let’s say, is also female-oriented and woman-oriented) would have would have been 
selected to adopt a child. On Dembroff’s strategy of re-description, Chris is subject to sex-
discrimination, and he ought to be legally protected accordingly.30  
 
I agree with Dembroff that their categorization scheme ascribes orientations to non-cisheterosexual 
individuals and can be used in legal contexts to protect LGBTQIA+ individuals against 
discrimination. That said, in what follows, I’ll argue that LGBTQIA+ social movements have 
                                               
28 Ibid. 19.  
29 Ibid., 19-20.  
30 The Supreme Court of the United States correctly ruled that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 protects LGBTQIA+ individuals against employment discrimination in Bostock v. Clayton 
County, Georgia, No. 17-1618, Altitude Express, Inc., et al. v. Zarda et al., as Co-Independent 
Executors of the Estate of Zarda, No. 17-1623, and R. G. & G. R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc. v. 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission et al., No. 18-107. The majority opinion echoes 
Robin Dembroff and Issa Kohler-Hausmann’s argument that discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation or gender identity amounts to “discrimination because of sex” (expressly prohibited by 
Title VII), see “Brief of Philosophy Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of the Employees,” nos. 
17-1618, 17-1623, 18-107, (United States Supreme Court filed July 3, 2019). 
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strategic reason to endorse a categorization scheme that includes categories such as asexual, 
heterosexual, homosexual, and bisexual. While Dembroff explicitly includes the category asexual 
in their categorization scheme, they recommend that we eliminate concepts of categories such as 
heterosexual, homosexual, and bisexual.31 
 
Now, it might seem that individuals who possess concepts of categories such as female-oriented, 
woman-oriented, female, and woman would more-or-less automatically also possess concepts of 
categories such as homosexual. If that were the case, however, Dembroff’s claim that we ought to 
eliminate concepts of categories such as homosexual while using concepts of categories such as 
female-oriented, woman-oriented, female, and woman would be self-undermining. But that’s not 
the case. It makes sense to claim that individuals ought to differentiate between members and non-
members of categories such as female-oriented, woman-oriented, female, and woman without also 
differentiating between members and non-members of categories such as heterosexual, 
homosexual, and bisexual.32 Indeed, Dembroff speaks to this point directly; on their view, “there 
are no such sexual orientations as (e.g.) ‘homosexual’ or ‘heterosexual’ [… and] there is no 
distinction in the sexual orientations of (e.g.) a cisgender man and a transgender woman who both 
are exclusively attracted to women.”33 
 
Of course, eliminating concepts of categories such as heterosexual, homosexual, and bisexual 
would have extremely significant political upshots. For example, Dembroff holds that the 
elimination of the aforementioned concepts would do away with the separation between queer and 
straight communities.34 While I agree with this counterfactual assessment, I reject Dembroff’s 
proposed political strategy. Dembroff holds that in order to advance LGBTQIA+ interests, we 
ought to dissolve the social significance of same-sex and same-gender attractions, such that “[t]he 
statistical divide between cisheterosexuality and queer sexual orientations simply disappears.”35 
At this historical moment, however, I reject such a strategy. On this point, I’m influenced by Díaz-
León, who claims: 
 
“[There is a] similarity between those people who identify as male/men and are attracted 
to other males/men, and those who identify as female/women and are attracted to 
females/women. And I believe that it is politically useful to have concepts that make this 
                                               
31 Dembroff, “What is Sexual Orientation?,” 3 and 19. 
32 Note that this result holds on the Haslangerian account of concepts discussed above, in which 
concepts are individuated by their role in our practices, Haslanger, “How Not to Change the 
Subject.” 
33 Dembroff, “What is Sexual Orientation?,” 19. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
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similarity salient since this is an important dimension of discrimination that is politically 
useful to emphasize, to wit, these two communities occupy similar social positions 
regarding many factors such as cultural representations, access to marriage benefits, 
housing, healthcare, and so on […] And those who are either male/men and are (only) 
attracted to female/women, or female/women who are (only) attracted to males/men have 
some similar privileges.”36  
 
Along these lines, I’ll argue LGBTQIA+ social movements ought to endorse a categorization 
scheme that includes categories such as heterosexual, homosexual, bisexual, and asexual. To 
begin, I’ll argue that differentiating between heterosexual and non-heterosexual individuals is 
conducive to LGBTQIA+ solidarity.  
 
Following Tommie Shelby, let’s say that a group has solidarity to the extent that its members, 
“identify, both subjectively and publicly, with each other or with the group as a whole […] share 
a set of values or goals […] show loyalty to in-group members as opposed to those of the relevant 
out-group [… and] trust one another.”37 Groups that sustain these features with respect to 
identification, shared value, loyalty, and trust have the potential to generate significant political 
power. Indeed, Shelby holds that black people, “can make progress in overcoming or ameliorating 
their shared condition only if they embrace black solidarity.”38 The same point about the political 
power of solidarity applies to LGBTQIA+ social movements, and so ameliorative desideratum (ii) 
provides reason to distinguish individuals with respect to sexuality in such a way that promotes 
LGBTQIA+ solidarity. 
 
So, what divisions with respect to sexuality might promote solidarity among LGBTQIA+ 
individuals? Consider that Shelby argues that black solidarity is secured by the collective 
recognition of a shared experience of racial oppression; on this point, Shelby claims: “[t]he mutual 
identification among blacks—that familiar sense of ‘we-ness’—can be rooted, in part, in the shared 
experience of antiblack racism. This experience enables blacks to empathize with one another and 
sometimes moves them to provide mutual support in a world that is often hostile to their 
presence.”39 Following Shelby, I hold that asexual, bisexual, and homosexual individuals can 
promote LGBTQIA+ solidarity by collectively recognizing a shared oppression on the basis of 
                                               
36 Díaz-León, “Sexual Orientations: The Desire View.” 
37 Tommie Shelby, We Who Are Dark: The Philosophical Foundations of Black Solidarity 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England, Harvard University Press, 2007), 68-70. 
38 Ibid., 202. 
39 Ibid., 245. More expansively, Shelby argues against attempts to secure black solidarity on the 
basis of shared culture, ethnicity, and/or national identity, ibid., 203-36. Here, I don’t rule on 
whether the same points apply to LGBTQIA+ solidarity. 
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non-heterosexuality.40 In order collectively to recognize that shared oppression, we need to 
differentiate between heterosexual and non-heterosexual individuals; that is, we need an 
orientation categorization scheme that includes the category heterosexual. 
 
On this point, many asexual, bisexual, and homosexual individuals are already quite keen to 
differentiate themselves from heterosexual individuals. Indeed, LGBTQIA+ cultures have 
generated a vast array of orientation-communicating practices, ranging from the historical 
handkerchief code to the linguistic dynamics involved in contemporary code-switching. These 
orientation-communicating practices are often quite subtle, so as to remain invisible to potentially 
hostile individuals.41 The value of in-group communication notwithstanding, I stress that we don’t 
need to choose between LGBTQIA+ solidarity and mainstream social inclusion. To the contrary, 
on account of its political power, LGBTQIA+ solidarity is crucial to securing equal access to 
mainstream institutions. Moreover, LGBTQIA+ solidarity doesn’t preclude coalition with 
cisheterosexual individuals.42 Again, here’s Shelby: “[a]lthough blacks should surely work with 
antiracist nonblacks against racism and other forms of social injustice, there is no principled reason 
why blacks must give up their solidaristic commitment to each other to do so.”43 LGBTQIA+ 
solidarity is entirely compatible with coalition between LGBTQIA+ individuals and 
cisheterosexual allies, whose dedication to LGBTQIA+ social movements often emerges out of 
friendship, parenthood, or a sense of justice.44  
 
At this point, I’ve argued that LGBTQIA+ individuals can promote LGBTQIA+ solidarity by 
collectively recognizing a shared oppression on the basis of non-heterosexuality. Here’s reason to 
                                               
40 On my view, transgender individuals can likewise promote LGBTQIA+ solidarity by 
collectively recognizing a shared oppression on the basis of transgender gender identity. And 
LGBTQIA+ individuals can ultimately secure an encompassing LGBTQIA+ solidarity by 
collectively recognizing the inseparability of gender-based and sexuality-based oppression. For 
discussion of inseparable social identities, see Sara Bernstein, “The Metaphysics of 
Intersectionality,” Philosophical Studies 177 (2020), 325-30. 
41 For related discussion of in-group communication among members of oppressed racial groups, 
see Luvell Anderson, “Hermeneutical Impasses,” Philosophical Topics 45 (2017), 6. 
42 For clarity, here I use ‘solidarity’ to refer to political unity among LGBTQIA+ individuals and 
‘coalition’ to refer to political unity between LGBTQIA+ individuals and cisheterosexual 
individuals. 
43 Indeed, Shelby notes that this compatibility of in-group solidarity and out-group coalition 
generalizes across other axes of oppression: “[t]here is room for nested and overlapping forms of 
antiracist solidarity, just as there is space for more or less exclusive and inclusive collective 
struggles at other sites of oppression, such as class, gender, culture, and sexuality,” Shelby, We 
Who Are Dark: The Philosophical Foundations of Black Solidarity, 240.  
44 Roughly, an ally is a cisheterosexual individual who takes up a role promoting LGBTQIA+ 
interests, see Kurt Blankschaen, “Allied Identities,” Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 2 (2016).   
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differentiate between members and non-members of the category heterosexual. In what follows, 
I’ll argue that in order to promote the well-being of LGBTQIA+ individuals, LGBTQIA+ social 
movements also have strategic reason to differentiate between members and non-members of the 
categories homosexual, bisexual, and asexual. 
 
To begin, consider the experiences and interests of asexual individuals. For example, it’s common 
for asexual individuals to experience pathologization. On this point, Mark Carrigan’s interviews 
about asexual experience include testimony such as, “I thought that there might be something 
wrong with me” and “I continued to wonder why I was broken.”45 Of course, asexuality is entirely 
compatible with human flourishing. And the pathologization experienced by many asexual 
individuals is rooted in ideology: “[the] ubiquitous affirmation of sex, its perceived normalcy and 
centrality to a healthy life, can preclude self-acceptance as a culturally available option for 
asexuals.”46 
 
Now, LGBTQIA+ social movements have ameliorated the aforementioned experience of 
pathologization through the cultivation of asexual community.47 For example, like many other 
LGBTQIA+ organizations, NYC’s Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Community Center 
hosts, “[a] support group for people who identify on the asexual and/or aromantic spectrum to 
share experiences, form community and explore their concerns and feelings around society, 
individuality, identity and more.”48 While this support group is open to allies and other 
LGBTQIA+ individuals, it’s centered around the experiences and interests of asexual and 
aromantic individuals. In order to promote the well-being of asexual individuals, then, it’s strategic 
to differentiate between asexual and non-asexual individuals. Here’s reason to endorse an 
orientation categorization scheme that includes the category asexual. 
 
Next, consider the experiences and interests of bisexual individuals. For example, William Jeffries, 
working with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, describes the highly-specific social 
issues that bisexual individuals face with respect to the treatment and prevention of HIV/AIDS: 
 
                                               
45 Mark Carrigan, “There’s More to Life than Sex? Difference and Commonality within the 
Asexual Community” in Sexualities: Identities, Behaviors, and Society, eds. Michael Kimmel and 
The Stony Brook Sexualities Research Group (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 342 and 
345. 
46 Ibid., 345. 
47 Carrigan reports that “[t]he acquisition of a communal identity serves to ward off pathology […] 
it facilitates a self-clarification and self-acceptance,” ibid.  
48 Oasis Support Group at The Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Community Center, 
gaycenter.org, accessed June 2020. 
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Biphobia can manifest in erroneous beliefs that MSMW [men who have sex with men and 
women] are closeted gay men and, particularly for black men, responsible for HIV 
transmission to women. Experiencing these sentiments can contribute to social isolation 
and psychological distress, which in turn may promote HIV/STI risk through substance 
use, sexual risk behaviors, and avoidance of prevention services. Researchers have argued 
that biphobia may explain some MSMW’s HIV testing avoidance.49 
 
This situation calls for interventions tailored to bisexual individuals.50 Indeed, marketing 
campaigns, group meetings, and counseling services sensitive to the social experiences of bisexual 
men of color have produced significant, measurable improvements with respect to rates of 
unprotected sex.51 Accordingly, in the context of ameliorating injustices related to the treatment 
and prevention of HIV/AIDS, it’s strategic to differentiate between bisexual and non-bisexual 
individuals. Here’s reason to endorse an orientation categorization scheme that includes the 
category bisexual.  
 
Above, I argued that in order to promote LGBTQIA+ solidarity and LGBTQIA+ well-being, it’s 
strategic to differentiate between members and non-members of categories such as heterosexual, 
homosexual, bisexual, and asexual. Accordingly, Dembroff’s thinly-relational orientation 
categorization scheme faces issues with respect to ameliorative desideratum (ii). 
 
 
 
                                               
49 William L. Jeffries IV, “Beyond the Bisexual Bridge: Sexual Health Among U.S. Men Who 
Have Sex with Men and Women,” American Journal of Preventive Medicine 47 (2014), 323. For 
discussion of disparities in rates of HIV testing in bisexual men compared to homosexual men 
(such that bisexual men are significantly less likely than homosexual men to have received an HIV 
test in their lifetime), see William L. Jeffries IV, “HIV Testing Among Bisexual Men in the United 
States,” AIDS Education and Prevention 22 (2010), Anthony Lyons, Marian Pitts, Jeffrey 
Grierson, Anthony Smith, Stephen McNally, and Murray Couch, “Sexual Behavior and HIV 
Testing Among Bisexual Men: A Nationwide Comparison of Australian Bisexual-Identifying and 
Gay-Identifying Men,” AIDS and Behavior 16 (2010), and Brian A. Feinstein, Kevin O. Moran, 
Michael E. Newcomb, and Brian Mustanski, “Differences in HIV Risk Behaviors Between Self-
Identified Gay and Bisexual Young Men Who Are HIV-Negative,” 48 (2019). 
50 Jeffries, “Beyond the Bisexual Bridge: Sexual Health Among U.S. Men Who Have Sex with 
Men and Women,” 324.  
51 These programs include Hombres Sanos, the Bruthas Project, Men of African American Legacy 
Empowering Self (MAALES), Enhanced Sexual Health Intervention for Men (ES-HIM), 
POWER, Men in Life Environments (MILE), and Project Rise, see Brian A. Feinstein and Brian 
Dodge, “Meeting the Sexual Health Needs of Bisexual Men in the Age of Biomedical HIV 
Prevention: Gaps and Priorities,” Archives of Sexual Behavior 49 (2020), 221-3. 
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4. The Queer Categorization Scheme 
 
Above, I argued against Díaz-León and Dembroff’s respective orientation categorization schemes. 
So, how ought we to categorize individuals with respect to sexual orientation? Here, I argue that 
we ought to endorse the Queer Categorization Scheme, which has the following features: 
 
(a) Includes the categories heterosexual, homosexual, bisexual, asexual, and queer,  
 
(b) Distinguishes between attractions to sex features and attraction to gender features, and   
 
(c) Allows an element of interpretation, such that individuals have authority over whether 
their attractions to sex features and/or attractions to gender features determine their 
orientation. 
 
Here, I’m influenced by Saray Ayala’s account of the relation between sexual orientation and 
interpretation. On Ayala’s view, there’s “a core affect module consisting of some sort of 
neurophysiological state of the individual in relation to sexual-affective affects.”52 Yet, the 
properties at this neurophysiological level don’t fully determine sexual orientation: “while 
desires/affects are themselves constituted independently of any interpretation, the selection of 
some of those desires/affects and their conceptualization as related to the sex and/or gender of 
someone is an interpretative process necessary for sexual orientation.”53  
 
On the Queer Categorization Scheme, an individual has authority over whether their sex attractions 
and/or gender attractions (fully) determine their orientation. For example, consider Triston, a male 
man who is exclusively attracted to male genderqueer individuals. On the Queer Categorization 
Scheme, Triston has authority over whether his male-to-male sex attractions and/or man-to-
genderqueer gender attractions determine his orientation, such that (all and only) the attractions in 
exactly one of the following sets determine Triston’s orientation: 
 
(α): {male-to-male attractions} 
(β): {man-to-genderqueer attractions} 
(γ): {male-to-male attractions, man-to-genderqueer attractions} 
 
                                               
52 Saray Ayala, “Sexual Orientation and Choice,” Journal of Social Ontology (2016), 6. 
53 Ibid., 5 and 7.  
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For example, suppose that Triston engages in an interpretative process such that his sex attractions 
determine his orientation. In that case, Triston’s male-to-male attractions determine his orientation, 
and he’s homosexual. 
 
Here, there’s a distinction between genus-level attractions and species-level attractions. Genus-
level attractions include sex attractions and gender attractions. In contrast, species-level attractions 
include, e.g., female-to-female attractions, female-to-male attractions, and genderqueer-to-woman 
attractions. On the Queer Categorization Scheme, individuals have authority over what genus-level 
attractions determine their orientation, not over which particular species-level attractions 
determine their orientation. For example, consider Simone, a female woman who is exclusively 
attracted to female women and male men. On the Queer Categorization Scheme, the attractions in 
exactly one of the following sets determine Simone’s orientation: 
 
(δ): {female-to-female attractions, female-to-male attractions} 
(ε): {woman-to-woman attractions, woman-to-man attractions} 
(ζ): {female-to-female attractions, female-to-male attractions, woman-to-woman 
attractions, woman-to-man attractions} 
 
Perhaps it seems arbitrary to endorse a categorization scheme that provides individuals with 
authority over what genus-level attractions determine their orientation, without also allowing 
similar authority with respect to particular species-level attractions. Yet, this aspect of the Queer 
Categorization Scheme is due to the demands of ameliorative desideratum (ii), which holds that 
we ought to endorse a categorization scheme conducive to the constitutive aims of LGBTQIA+ 
social movements. On this point, suppose that Simone mistakenly believes that she’s exclusively 
attracted to female women, say on account of the invisibility of bisexuality in dominant cultural 
representations of sexual experience.54 A categorization scheme that provided individuals with 
authority over which particular species-level attractions determine their orientation would allow 
that Simone is homosexual. But we ought to reject that result on ameliorative grounds, as it would 
contribute to bisexual erasure.  
 
In sum, on the Queer Categorization Scheme, individuals identical with respect to attraction(s) can 
differ with respect to orientation. That’s because feature (c) allows individuals authority over 
whether their orientations are determined by their sex attractions and/or gender attractions. Neither 
Dembroff nor Díaz-León’s accounts of orientation include such an element of authority. And so, 
feature (c) is distinctive to the Queer Categorization Scheme. 
                                               
54 See Miranda Fricker, Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), 163-7. 
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Now, the aforementioned element of authority raises an important question. In particular, why are 
the categories of the Queer Categorization Scheme orientations, as opposed to ways in which 
individuals can subjectively identify with respect to orientation? Here, consider an analogy to the 
gender category woman. While I don’t endorse any particular account of gender in this paper, note 
that there are prominent theories of gender on which an individual is a woman in virtue of sincerely 
self-identifying as a woman. Consider Dembroff’s account, for example, on which the membership 
conditions of gender categories vary across mainstream and queer cultural contexts.55 For example, 
in mainstream social contexts, an individual’s gender is determined by their natal genitalia.56 In 
many queer cultural contexts, however, an individual is a member of the gender category woman 
in virtue of sincerely self-identifying as a woman: “[i]ndividuals are granted authority over their 
gender kind membership.”57 To complete the analogy, as sincere self-identification can figure into 
the membership conditions of gender categories, so interpretive acts can figure into the 
membership conditions of orientation categories. 
 
It’s important, however, not to overextend the analogy. On this point, consider again Simone (a 
female woman who is exclusively attracted to female women and male men). As noted above, in 
order to avoid perpetuating bisexual erasure, an orientation categorization scheme ought not to 
allow the result that Simone is homosexual. That’s the case even if Simone mistakenly believes 
that she’s exclusively attracted to female women. Likewise, ameliorative desideratum (ii) provides 
reason to reject a categorization scheme on which orientation is self-ascribed. Within this sort of 
ameliorative limit, however, individuals otherwise ought to have authority over the socially 
significant categories that they inhabit. This principle of authority is widely endorsed in flourishing 
LGBTQIA+ cultures, and it’s a central motivation for feature (c) of the Queer Categorization 
Scheme.  
 
At this point, I’ll turn to explicate the membership conditions of the categories in the Queer 
Categorization Scheme. To begin, on the Queer Categorization Scheme, asexuality is a distinct 
sexual orientation. An individual is a member of the category asexual just in case they don’t have 
significant sexual attractions.58 To be clear, some asexual individuals have romantic attractions, as 
                                               
55 Robin Dembroff, “Real Talk on the Metaphysics of Gender,” Philosophical Topics 
(forthcoming). 
56 Ibid.  
57 Ibid. 
58 More precisely, an individual is asexual just in case their orientation is determined by an empty 
set of sex and/or gender attractions. Now, what’s required to have an empty set of sex and/or 
gender attractions? In order to avoid overextending membership in the category asexual, I deny 
that mentally representing sex and/or gender features is a necessary condition for having a 
 18 
opposed to sexual attractions, which are often felt towards individuals with particular sex and/or 
gender features.59 
 
In order to explicate the membership conditions of the remaining categories in the Queer 
Categorization Scheme, it’ll be useful to have concepts of binary attractions and cissexual sets of 
attractions. Binary attractions exclusively involve the binary sex categories female and male or 
the binary gender categories woman and man. For example, the following attractions are binary: 
female-to-male attractions and woman-to-woman attractions. In contrast, neither genderqueer-to-
man attractions nor intersex-to-intersex attractions are binary. Next, cissexual sets of attractions 
involve attractions between cisgender individuals. For example, the following sets of attractions 
are cissexual: {male-to-female attractions, man-to-woman attractions} and {female-to-female 
attractions, woman-to-woman attractions}. In contrast, recall Josephine (a female woman who is 
exclusively attracted to female men). The following set of Josephine’s attractions isn’t cissexual: 
{female-to-female, woman-to-man}.  
 
With this terminology at hand, on the Queer Categorization Scheme, an individual is a member of 
the category homosexual just in case the attractions in exactly one of the following sets determine 
their orientation: a set of binary same-sex attractions, a set of binary same-gender attractions, or a 
cissexual set of same-sex and same-gender attractions. This point might be expressed in 
grounding-theoretic terms: an individual is homosexual just in case their orientation is grounded 
by the attractions in exactly one of the following sets: {female-to-female attractions}, {woman-to-
woman attractions}, {female-to-female attractions, woman-to-woman attractions}, {male-to-male 
attractions}, {man-to-man attractions}, {male-to-male attractions, man-to-man attractions}. For 
example, recall Triston, a male man who is exclusively attracted to male genderqueer individuals. 
On the Queer Categorization Scheme, Triston has authority over whether his sex attractions and/or 
gender attractions ground his orientation, and Triston is homosexual just in case he engages in an 
interpretive process such that his male-to-male sex attractions ground his orientation. 
 
Next, an individual is a member of the category heterosexual just in case the attractions in exactly 
one of the following sets determine their orientation: a set of binary other-sex attractions, a set of 
binary other-gender attractions, or a cissexual set of other-sex and other-gender attractions. For 
                                               
particular sex and/or gender attraction. For example, imagine an individual man who is exclusively 
disposed to sexually desire and/or engage with individuals who wear patterned jumpsuits, and 
further imagine that that individual man inhabits a world in which all and only men wear patterned 
jumpsuits. Even if that individual man didn’t possess any gender concepts, I hold that he would 
nonetheless have man-to-man attractions. Thanks to an anonymous referee for discussion. 
59 See the Asexuality Visibility and Education Network (AVEN), asexuality.org, accessed June 
2020. 
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example, an individual is heterosexual if their female-to-male attractions determine their 
orientation. For another example, an individual is heterosexual if their orientation is determined 
by their male-to-female attractions in concert with their man-to-woman attractions. 
 
Next, an individual is a member of the TRQ category bisexual just in case the attractions in exactly 
one of the following sets determine their orientation: a set of binary same-sex and other-sex 
attractions, a set of binary same-gender and other-gender attractions, or a cissexual set of same-
sex and other-sex attractions in concert with same-gender and other-gender attractions. For 
example, an individual is bisexual if their orientation is determined by their male-to-male 
attractions in concert with their male-to-female attractions.  
 
It’s important to note that these membership conditions diverge to an extent from those provided 
by some LGBTQIA+ individuals and organizations. I don’t take this point lightly, and I’ll return 
to address it below. Moreover, I stress that the aforementioned membership conditions aren’t 
essential to the Queer Categorization Scheme. That’s because they might be somewhat modified 
while retaining the distinctive element of interpretation in feature (c).  
 
Next, on the Queer Categorization Scheme, an individual is a member of the category queer just 
in case the attractions in exactly one of the following sets determine their orientation: a set of non-
binary sex attractions, a set of non-binary gender attractions, or a non-cissexual set of sex and 
gender attractions. For example, an individual is queer if their woman-to-genderfluid attractions 
determine their orientation. For another example, an individual is queer if their orientation is 
determined by their female-to-female attractions in concert with their woman-to-man attractions. 
 
At this point, I turn to consider how the Queer Categorization Scheme fares with respect to the 
ameliorative desiderata. To begin, I deny premise (i) in Dembroff’s argument against thickly-
relational categorization schemes by demonstrating that the Queer Categorization Scheme ascribes 
orientations to transgender, genderqueer, and intersex individuals, as well as to individuals 
attracted to transgender, genderqueer, or intersex individuals.  
 
Things are about going to get complicated. But that’s to be expected. Transgender, genderqueer, 
and intersex individuals, as well as individuals attracted to transgender, genderqueer, or intersex 
individuals navigate categorization with respect to sexual orientation in ways that aren’t always 
(ahem) straightforward. 
 
To begin, the Queer Categorization Scheme can ascribe orientations to genderqueer individuals as 
well as to individuals attracted to genderqueer individuals. For example, consider Elaine, a female 
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woman who, for most of her life, has been exclusively attracted to other female women. In the past 
few years, however, Elaine developed enduring sexual attractions to some genderqueer female 
individuals. Reflecting on this change, Elaine might reason: “My interest in female individuals is 
more important to my sexual orientation than any of my gender hang-ups. After all, I might have 
been attracted to some female men if I hadn’t been socialized in a culture that places so much 
significance on gender.” Alternatively: “While I enjoy female bodies, I’m also drawn to 
genderqueer gender presentation. That said, homosexuality is important to my self-conception, and 
I don’t want to give it up.” In either case, Elaine interprets her attractions such that her female-to-
female attractions determine her orientation, and she’s homosexual. 
 
But these aren’t the only interpretative options available to Elaine. For example, Elaine might 
reason: “Being a lesbian is really important to me, but I don’t need to be homosexual in order to 
be a lesbian. After all, I know some heterosexual trans men who are part of the lesbian 
community.60 I’m attracted to women and genderqueer individuals, and I’d like my orientation to 
reflect my sexual phenomenology.” Here, Elaine interprets her attractions such that her woman-
to-woman attractions in concert with her woman-to-genderqueer attractions determine her 
orientation. And she’s queer. 
 
On the Queer Categorization Scheme, then, Elaine has authority over whether her (female-to-
female) sex attractions and/or (woman-to-woman and woman-to-genderqueer) gender attractions 
determine her orientation. To be clear, however, that authority doesn’t foreclose normative 
assessment. For example, if Elaine were to decide that her sex attractions determine her orientation 
(such that she’s homosexual), she might disrespect the genderqueer identity of some the 
individuals to which she’s attracted. Authority generates risk. But that doesn’t mean that 
individuals ought to be denied authority over the socially significant categories that they inhabit. 
The solution, instead, is to cultivate incentive structures and epistemic resources that are conducive 
to the ethical exercise of authority. 
 
Next, the Queer Categorization Scheme can ascribe orientations to transgender individuals and 
intersex individuals, as well as to individuals attracted to transgender or intersex individuals. For 
example, consider again Chris (a female man who is exclusively attracted to female women). On 
the Queer Categorization Scheme, Chris’s orientation is either heterosexual, homosexual, or queer. 
For example, if Chris engages in an interpretive process such that his female-to-female attractions 
determine his orientation, then he is homosexual. Additionally, consider again Dylan (an intersex 
                                               
60 Continue inner dialogue: “Plus, I read Gayle Rubin’s interesting paper on the topic, “Of 
Catamites and Kings: Reflections on Butch, Gender, and Boundaries” in The Transgender Studies 
Reader, ed. Susan Stryker and Stephen Whittle (New York: Routledge, 2006), 476-8. 
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man who is exclusively attracted to female women). On the Queer Categorization Scheme, Dylan 
is heterosexual in case he engages in an interpretive process such that his man-to-woman 
attractions determine his orientation. 
 
Given this flexibility, note that orientation ascriptions are sensitive to a more general concept of 
sexual orientation. On this point, I’m inclined to think that we ought to endorse a concept of sexual 
orientation such that orientation isn’t a “deep” feature of the self that necessarily remains constant 
across contexts.61 For example, in contexts in which Elaine is attempting to make her experiences 
intelligible to a few straight relatives, she might claim homosexuality. In contrast, while 
communicating her sexual desires to members of a local LGBTQIA+ community, Elaine might 
interpret her attractions such that she’s queer. There’s so much complexity that could be explored 
here. For the present purposes, however, what’s important is that the Queer Categorization Scheme 
ascribes orientations to transgender, genderqueer, and intersex individuals, as well as to individuals 
attracted to transgender, genderqueer, or intersex individuals. And so, the Queer Categorization 
Scheme satisfies ameliorative desideratum (i). 
 
Next, regarding ameliorative desideratum (ii), I hold that the Queer Categorization Scheme is 
conducive to the constitutive aims of LGBTQIA+ social movements. As discussed at length in the 
second section, in order to promote LGBTQIA+ solidarity and LGBTQIA+ well-being, it’s 
strategic to differentiate between members and non-members of thickly-relational orientation 
categories. Accordingly, the Queer Categorization Scheme satisfies ameliorative desideratum (ii). 
 
At this point, I’ll return to the membership conditions of the category bisexual. (Again, I don’t aim 
to settle this contested issue in the context of this paper.) As noted above, on the Queer 
Categorization Scheme, the membership conditions of the category bisexual diverge to an extent 
from those endorsed by some LGBTQIA+ individuals and organizations. For example, the 
Bisexual Resource Center holds that an individual is bisexual just in case they’re non-monosexual, 
in contrast to monosexual individuals who are attracted to individuals of a single gender.62 Yet, 
it’s important that some non-monosexual individuals don’t self-identify as bisexual, e.g., some 
women who are attracted to both women and genderqueer individuals don’t self-identify as 
bisexual.63 Of course, individuals can be mistaken about their orientations. My point here is 
                                               
61 Here, I follow Cheshire Calhoun, who claims to have “switched sexual orientation from 
heterosexual to lesbian,” Feminism, The Family, and the Politics of the Closet: Lesbian and Gay 
Displacement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). See also Gayle Rubin, “Thinking Sex: 
Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexuality” in Deviations: A Gayle Rubin Reader 
(Durham and London, Duke University Press, 2011), 147-8. 
62 “Bisexuality101: Labels,” Bisexual Resource Center, biresource.org, accessed June 2019. 
63 The Bisexual Resource Center acknowledges this empirical point, ibid. 
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methodological. On account of the aforementioned disagreement, it wouldn’t be justified simply 
to defer to the non-monosexual interpretation. 
 
Earlier, I argued that LGBTQIA+ social movements ought to categorize individuals with respect 
to sexual orientation in such a way that promotes LGBTQIA+ solidarity and LGBTQIA+ well-
being. Along these lines, LGBTQIA+ social movements have strategic reason to endorse an 
orientation categorization scheme that includes the category queer. That’s because members and 
non-members of the orientation category queer have significantly different social experiences, 
which aren’t tracked by the monosexual/non-monosexual distinction. In particular, members of 
the orientation category queer are unjustly affected by cisnormativity. Broadly, cisnormativity is 
an element of the dominant ideology which holds that an individual’s gender (as either a man or a 
woman) is determined by their sex assigned at birth (as either male or female). As Susan Stryker 
explains, “our culture today tries to reduce the wide range of livable body types to two and only 
two genders […] with both genders being based on our beliefs about the meaning of biological 
sex.”64  
 
Regarding the ways in which cisnormativity unjustly affects the well-being of members of the 
orientation category queer, consider the sexual stigmatization of trans-attracted individuals, here 
described by Julia Serano: 
 
[T]rans people and bodies are highly stigmatized throughout society. This stigmatization 
inflicts shame on those of us who are trans—a shame that many of us work hard to 
overcome. But this shame also affects people who find us attractive—not in the same way, 
nor to the same extent, but it does affect them. Rather than seeing their attraction toward 
us as “normal” and “healthy,” society teaches them to view it as a “fetish.” This shame 
encourages them to keep their attraction secret—this applies to both cis people who self-
identify as “admirers,” “fetishists,” or “chasers” and purposefully seek out trans partners, 
as well as to those cis people who are surprised to find out that the person they are attracted 
to, or dating, or have fallen in love with, is trans and who subsequently hides that info (and 
sometimes even their partner’s existence) from friends and family.65 
 
Here, Serano explains that cisnormativity unjustly affects the well-being of trans-attracted 
individuals, rendering (what are often) normatively unproblematic sexual attractions a source of 
                                               
64 Susan Stryker, Transgender History: The Roots of Today’s Revolution (New York, NY: Seal 
Press, 2017), 17. 
65 Julia Serano, Outspoken: A Decade of Transgender Activism and Trans Feminism (Oakland, 
CA: Switch Hitter Press, 2016), 207-8. 
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distress.66 Of course, the cisnormative stigmatization of trans-attraction unjustly affects the well-
being of transgender individuals, as it further complicates the process of sustaining healthy sexual 
relationships.67 Moreover, cisnormative ideology represents transgender gender identity as the 
result of sexual perversion. On this point, Talia Mae Bettcher explains that individuals often 
“construe transsexuality in terms of sexual desire [… and] reduce cross-gender identification to a 
kind of sexual fetish.”68 In part, the cisnormative stigmatization of transgender sexuality explains 
oppressive phenomena such as accusations that trans women are sexually deceptive homosexual 
men as well as testimonial injustices in medical contexts involving “autogynephilic” diagnoses of 
gender dysphoria.69 Because members of the orientation category queer share interests with respect 
to sexual destigmatization (viz., involving the mitigation of the effects of cisnormativity), it’s 
strategic for LGBTQIA+ social movements to differentiate between members and non-members 
of the orientation category queer.  
 
In sum, the Queer Categorization Scheme is conducive to the constitutive aims of LGBTQIA+ 
social movements, especially involving the promotion of LGBTQIA+ solidarity and LGBTQIA+ 
well-being. Furthermore, the Queer Categorization Scheme allows the ascription of sexual 
orientations to transgender, genderqueer, and intersex individuals, as well as to individuals 
attracted to transgender, genderqueer, or intersex individuals. The Queer Categorization Scheme, 
then, satisfies ameliorative desideratum (i) and ameliorative desideratum (ii). And so, I endorse 
the Queer Categorization Scheme. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The following question is normatively significant. How ought we to categorize individuals with 
respect to sexual orientation? While the socially dominant orientation categorization scheme is 
                                               
66 The parenthetical qualification is required on account of the fetishization of transgender 
individuals; it’s wrong to sexualize individuals in ways that are “depersonalized,” “homogenized,” 
or “otherized,” Robin Zheng, “Why Yellow Fever Isn’t Flattering: A Case Against Racial 
Fetishes,” Journal of the American Philosophical Association (2016), 407-8. 
67 Dembroff, “What is Sexual Orientation?,” 11. For related data on the prevalence of 
discriminatory dating preferences, see Karen L. Blair and Rhea Ashley Hoskin, “Transgender 
Exclusion from the World of Dating: Patterns of Acceptance and Rejection of Hypothetical Trans 
Dating Partners as a Function of Sexual and Gender Identity,” Journal of Social and Personal 
Relationships (2019). 
68 Talia Mae Bettcher, “Feminist Perspectives on Trans Issues,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Stanford, CA: Stanford University, 2014). 
69 See Talia Mae Bettcher, “Evil Deceivers and Make-Believers: On Transphobic Violence and 
the Politics of Illusion,” Hypatia (2007), 46-50 and Charles Moser, “Autogynephilia in Women,” 
Journal of Homosexuality (2009), 544-5. 
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somewhat conducive to the constitutive aims of LGBTQIA+ social movements, it doesn’t allow 
the ascription of sexual orientations to many non-cisheterosexual individuals. In contrast, 
categorization schemes that primarily include categories such as female-oriented and woman-
oriented allow the ascription of sexual orientations to transgender, genderqueer, and intersex 
individuals, as well as to individuals attracted to transgender, genderqueer, or intersex individuals, 
but such categorization schemes aren’t always conducive to the promotion of LGBTQIA+ 
solidarity and LGBTQIA+ well-being.  
 
Ultimately, I hope to have developed an orientation categorization scheme that allows the 
ascription of sexual orientations to transgender, genderqueer, and intersex individuals, as well as 
to individuals attracted to transgender, genderqueer, or intersex individuals, while being conducive 
to the constitutive aims of LGBTQIA+ social movements. That said, I stress that I do not aim to 
legislate, only to explicate conceptual resources. Like other social categories, sexual orientation 
categories are essentially negotiable. Still, this much is fixed: “Our categories are important. We 
cannot organize a social life, a political movement, or our individual identities and desires without 
them.”70 
                                               
70 Rubin, “Of Catamites and Kings: Reflections on Butch, Gender, and Boundaries,” 479.  
